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Abstract Making better choices about future technolo-
gies that are being researched or developed is an impor-
tant motivator behind lay ethics interventions. However,
in practice, they do not always succeed to serve that
goal. Especially authors who have noted that lay ethi-
cists sometimes take recourse to well-known themes
which stem from old, even ‘archetypical’ stories, have
been criticized for making too little room for agency and
decision-making in their approach. This paper aims to
contribute to a reflection on how lay ethics can acquire
more practical relevance. It will use resources in narra-
tive ethics to suggest that in order to be relevant for
action, facilitators of lay ethics interventions need to
invite participants to engage in a narrative quest. As part
of a quest, lay ethicists should be asked to (1) reflect on a
specific question or choice, (2) use diverse (imaginative)
input which is informative about the heterogeneity of
viewpoints that are defended in society and (3) argue for
their standpoints.
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Scholarly attention to the societal value of new and
emerging technologies, responds to an awareness
that science and engineering may not only lead to
technological products which are unambiguously
good. While research and development of these
technologies goes together with promises about
how they will enhance economic growth, strengthen
international competitiveness and enlarge human
wellbeing, there is awareness of the ways in which
they may also, at the same time, put current moral
convictions and routines under pressure. Given this
uncertain and debatable value, it is considered wise
to anticipate the future and determine ahead of time
whether technologies that scientists research and
develop are actually desirable or not.
One of the ways to do this, is by involving
members of the public in an evaluative reflection
about new technologies. Such endeavors are some-
times called ‘lay ethics’. Participants in such ac-
tivities are ‘lay’ in the sense that they received no
previous ethical training, yet they are invited to
make their values explicit, imagine how those
values may be effected by the introduction of a
new technology into their lives and evaluate the
desirability of those technologies.
These last years, the reflections of lay ethicists
are sometimes preferred to the reflections of pro-
fessional ethicists for two reasons. First of all, the
reflections of laymen are rich and take into ac-
count the profound and varied ways in which
technologies—such as internet or the mobile
phone—may alter people’s everyday experience,
emotion, motivation to act, daily routine, and ways
to (inter)act and relate to others [5, 6, 25]. By
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contrast, professional ethicists, especially those
who adopt a principalist approach grounded in
deontology or utilitarian theory, focus just on a
selection of general issues, such as risk, autonomy,
privacy and justice. These professional ethicists,
furthermore, often translate the principles which
shape their approach into a general checklist,
which significantly shrinks the amount of topics
that they are able to take into account and ignore
all the other ways in which technologies may have
different effects on diverse socio-cultural contexts
[13, 1]. It is because the ethical reflection of lay
ethicists did not yet pass the filter of ethical the-
ory, that it is considered more apt to take broader,
richer and more substantive issues into account.
Another, second, reason to ask laymen rather
than professional ethicists is political. It is consid-
ered problematic that professional ethicists acquire
a privileged position in the debate about the value
of new technologies; for, as professionals, their
viewpoints carry the weight of expert discourse
and they are granted visibility and legitimacy
which the viewpoints that non-professional ethicist
lack. Therefore, not every participant in the moral
world has equal power to give shape to the ethical
debate about the desirability of a new technology,
while they do all have to live with the effects of
that technology. To make the debate more inclu-
sive, scholars have selected members of the gen-
eral public as the eligible ethical thinkers, there-
with making voices audible that would otherwise
less likely be heard. Including lay ethicists is
expected to ‘increase public trust’ in science, as
no one acquires a privileged role in steering de-
velopments in a particular direction ([6], 3).
Lay ethics is supposed to be relevant for choice,
for it should help to steer the development of new
technologies in more desirable directions. Yet, in
practice, it does not always succeed to serve that
goal. It has been noted, more often, that public
discussion about new technologies often repeats
and reaffirms well-known moral points of view in
a somewhat mantra-like fashion [21, 28]. This
happens also in lay ethics interventions. Lay ethics
studies by Sarah Davies and Phil Macnaghten are
criticized for this reason. While one of the key
points in the study by Davies and Macnaghten is
to make room for the agency of a lay public in the
academic and political debate which usually
ignores the public opinions, the themes that par-
ticipants brought forwards in focus groups are
analyzed in terms of old stories, which they call
‘archetypical stories’. This allows to appreciate the
deep rootedness of these stories in the cultural
history of society. However, the repetitiveness of
the same age-old stories also raises the question
whether lay ethics is actually able to offer assess-
ments that provide a helpful guide to take action
and shape the future.1
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion
about whether and how the past can be made
relevant for present-day decision-making which
shapes the future in lay ethics. It will describe
the main message of the papers in which Davies
and Macnaghten present their lay ethics interven-
tions, as they are the ones who gave shape to a
lay ethics that roots in historical stories, and it will
describe some of the criticism Davies and
Macnaghten received. After that, it will use re-
sources in narrative ethics to show how the rela-
tion between tradition, narrative and decision-
making towards the future has been understood
and discussed there for some decades. It will re-
sume some aspects in that discussion and draw
attention to the notion of a ‘narrative quest’, which
plays a pivotal role in linking traditional stories to
present decision-making and a yet to be experi-
enced future in narrative ethics. Based on this
input, the paper will make suggestions as to how
that narrative quest can be integrated into lay
ethics in order to make it more practically relevant
for navigating the future, even if participants bring
forwards historically rooted stories.
While I focus here on Davies and Macnaghten’s
lay ethics interventions, the aim of this article is
broader than just adding to the debate about their
studies. It will contribute to a further elaboration
of the theme of narrative in assessments of the
1 Alfred Nordmann is one of the most prominent critics of the
repetition in the public engagement exercises. Interestingly, he also
gave it an ethical dimension, saying that we would be paternalists
if we would judge the future based on our own current morality,
which roots in history, as we know that current moral standards
will probably change as an effect of the co-evolution of technology
and society. Future people—including our own future selves—
may have developed a very different moral outlook and it would
be wrong to judge them based on what we think is morally
defensible now [20].
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future, which has recently been called for.2 The
reason why Davies and Macnaghten are taken here
as a starting point is because their approach allows
to show how convincing it is to think of narratives
as transcending present-day people, while at the
same time revealing the difficulties that it raises
for an understanding of the agency of lay ethicists.
Debate about the ‘archetypical stories’
The lay ethics interventions that Sarah Davies and Phil
Macnaghten carried out are based on two projects: one
was the DEEPEN project, a multidisciplinary project,
which involved members of the public from Portugal
and theUK into an ethical reflection on nanotechnological
futures [5]; the other reports about a similar study carried
out in the UK only [18]. In both studies, the participants’
reflection was generated by asking them to reflect on
general optimistic as well as pessimistic narratives about
nanotechnology futures, presenting nanotechnology as a
science that can contribute to scientific breakthroughs, to
human enhancement (more health, lengthening of life and
a strengthening and broadening of human capacities), to a
cleaner environment, and to different products, but also to
control over nature, uncertainty and risks ([5] 142, [18]
29). The DEEPEN project used a 3-stage methodology.
First, there was an initial focus group where participants
discussed the different representations of nanotechnology
which were introduced to them. Second, the focus group
would reconvene a few days later and they would discuss
the key issues andwork on the presentation of these issues
in the form of a sketch. Later that day, third, each group
would present its sketch in a theatre session. The theatre
session was shaped in the tradition of the Brazilian dra-
matist Augusto Boal ([5] 144). In the UK project, the
reflection of the participants was enhanced by confronting
them with three general styles of thought that are used to
present nanotechnological futures in policy reports, news-
paper articles, documentaries, industry presentations and
campaign materials ([18] 26).
In both studies there were diverse themes continually
recurring in the diverse responses of the focus group
participants which, according to the authors, referred to
common narratives that seemed to ‘underpin’ them. As
these narratives recall stories that have been told and
retold in many societies in Europe and the Americas,
Davies andMacnaghten call them ‘archetypal stories’ or
‘master narratives’, using terminology by Agnes Heller.
Archetypical narratives are deeply rooted within con-
temporary culture’; they are sometimes referred to as
‘mythic cultural tropes’ because the recurrence of the
themes in the speeches of various lay ethicists suggest
that they have traditional or legendary status ([5] 146),
and sometimes they are explained as offering ‘refer-
ences to a shared tradition’, which reveals that they not
only give expression to a shared way of thinking about
the future, as ‘guides of imagination’, but also to a
shared way of life ([5] 145). Five examples of such
archetypal or master narratives are described in the
article about the DEEPEN project; the UK project car-
ried out by Macnaghten alone mentions just a subset of
them ([18] 31):
& The ‘be careful what you wish for’ narrative alludes
to ancient stories that call for prudence with regard
to the immediate force of desires, which may on
second thought not be as desirable as was initially
thought. Nanotechnologies represent seductive fu-
tures, but indulgence in these temptations may have
harmful consequences
& The ‘messing with nature’ narrative which summa-
rizes concerns around nanotechnology’s potential to
change nature. Nature in this narrative is taken to
imply an order, which should not be ‘messed with’
because took the entire evolution to come into
being.
& The ‘Pandora’s box’ narrative, which alludes to the
story of a temptingly closed box which will release
evils if it is opened. It refers to notions of uncertainty
with regard to new technology, while it may bear a
very attractive promise, it may eventually lead to
disaster, and then there’s no turning back.
2 It has been noted that there is a tendency in future studies to stop
looking at future anticipations as offering knowledge, but to in-
stead perceive them as offering narratives about the future [11, 20,
32, 24]. In the diverse fields of future studies, such as foresight,
technology assessment or studies into the ethical, legal and social
aspects (ELSA) of technology, narratives about the future may be
studied as accounts of present people’s understandings of the
future, which are rooted in historically generated practices, insti-
tutions and regulations [11]; or they are studied as a kind of speech
acts, that is, as stories about a technological future that are told to
an audience in order to solicit its (political, financial, scholarly)
support in bringing it about [3–4, 33–34]. Or they may do both at
the same time, such as Ariana Ferrari indicates when she writes
that ‘the way in which we describe the future will determine how
the future will be…’ ([8] 37) The relevance of stories for ethical
reflection about choices, has—to my knowledge—not been stud-
ied a lot in the field of future anticipation.
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& The ‘kept in the dark’ narrative, which reveals a
feeling of deep powerlessness of the general public
in the face of the development of nanotechnology.
Not only were many people unaware of the exis-
tence of nanotechnology; they also have little way of
having any impact on it at all.
& The ‘rich get richer and the poor get poorer narra-
tive’, which draws together concerns about techno-
logical development which acquires shape in a con-
text in which commercial and consumption oriented
considerations are dominant. The story gives voice
to the supposition that technology will benefit those
who can pay for it, and not the poorer people.
While these narratives are presented as the result of
focus group discussions, naming them ‘archetypical’ or
‘master’ narratives also gives them a meaning that en-
compasses an analysis of what these people said. They
refer to a common history, a lived tradition, which
suggests that they will probably remain important in
the future. This is also what the authors seem to think.
They claim that the catalogue of ‘archetypical narra-
tives’ is open to expansion, for some ‘archetypical
stories’ (such as Pandora’s box) are very old, while
others (such as ‘the rich get richer and the poor get
poorer’ narrative) developed more recently; and they
also mention that all of these narratives are counter
narratives which oppose the language which has been
most dominant since the enlightenment and which holds
science responsible for ‘progress’ and ‘breakthroughs’.
Yet, the familiarity of the articulated ‘master narratives’,
their repetition in ancient stories, in fables, literature,
and more recently in films, science fiction and video
games is also a reason for the authors to claim that they
will be important in the future too: ‘(..) it is precisely
these kinds of narrative that will continue to shape
popular perceptions of science and technology, and
which will provide the landscape over which future
technopolitics will be articulated’ ([18] 33).
The historical rootedness of these master narratives
sketches a picture of lay ethical reflection as being
firmly tied to a shared heritage of stories. While the
stories offer resources to adopt a general critical attitude
towards new technologies, they also reveal the public’s
impoverished agency in shaping technological futures
as these stories are inherited and retold rather than
shaped by the public. This limited agency is also what
came forwards in criticisms of these ‘archetypical
stories’ as output of a lay ethics intervention. The
optional character of the conversations between the lay
ethicists, for example, is reason for Ferrari and
Nordmann [9] to call such interventions ‘morality play’,
as they rehearse, reiterate and reaffirm the moral points
of views ‘in a somewhat ritualistic fashion’ ([9] 173).
While such ‘morality play’ is not worthless, Ferrari and
Nordmann also criticize it for remaining ‘conversation-
al’, meaning that ‘…concerns are expressed in open-
ended ways (..) no decisions need to be taken, no judg-
ments need to be made, no conclusions need to be
reached’ ([9] 174). The conversation lacks practical
relevance and therefore Ferrari and Nordmann suggest
that ‘… nanoethics needs to delineate and sharpen issues
in such a way that they can return to the political arena’
([9] 175).
This criticism receives a different articulation in a
recent article by Erik Thorstensen [31]. While part of
Thorstensen’s critique of Davies and Macnaghten’s ap-
proach to lay ethics is methodological, his somewhat
aggressively formulated attack becomes most interest-
ing when he addresses the topic of narrative. Calling the
narratives ‘archetypical’ rather than just using them as
‘interpretative tools’ to make sense of the responses of
the focus group participants, deserves to be looked at
with caution, Thorstensen claims. As ‘archetypical nar-
ratives’, these stories become the ‘beginnings and end-
ings of a culture’ and they eclipse the role of story-tellers
([31] 229). This is problematic, according to
Thorstensen, because it disrespects the very common
presupposition in narrative studies that there are no
stories without narrators; moreover, it seems to commit
the ‘ontological fallacy’ that supposes that there are
stories ‘out there’, quite independent of story tellers
and prior to the narrative process ([31] 230). It is of
course questionable how a story without a teller can ever
offer a valuable lead for action that helps to shape the
technological future of society, as the agents who might
take such actions are omitted.
Macnaghten and Davies respond to these criticisms
with colleague Matthew Kearnes and elaborate their
perspective to narrative in later articles. [12, 19]. In an
article from 2015, they argue against critics who state
that archetypical narratives have little impact on policy,
that this is not a limitation of these narratives them-
selves; rather, it reveals a resistance to these stories by
its recipients, such as policy makers who decide about
what research should be funded and which products
should be allowed on the market. Rather than relying
‘on the dominant master narrative of progress and
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scientific breakthrough (..)’ ([19] 13), the authors argue
here that more responsible research and innovation pol-
icy makers should cultivate their capacity to respond to
the wider range of considerations that figure in the
counter-narratives that lay ethicists bring forwards,
which would require ‘institutional and regulatory rede-
sign’ ([19] 14).
In this article, furthermore, Macnaghten, Davies and
Kearnes respond to the criticism by an elaboration of
their perspective on narrative. They take distance from
individual—psychological and cognitive—approaches
to narrative, which understand narratives to originate
from individual cognitive or affective processes; and they
also argue against conversational approaches which take
narratives to arise from conversational interaction be-
tween people. Instead, they take a perspective which
‘transcends’ individuals as well as immediate interaction
between people, for they want to pay attention to how
public concerns emerge from social and cultural process-
es. It is for this reason that they adopt a perspective which
allows to appreciate how narratives are based on a dis-
cursive, social, cultural and theological ‘heritage’ which
people share and which steers the perceptions and opin-
ions that they have individually or which they may bring
forwards in conversation with others ([19] 3). Sidingwith
philosopher Charles Taylor, they defend the view that
stories depict a world of moral wisdom that is rooted in
an inherited and shared past, which encompasses the
consciousness of present-day participants in an ethical
reflection. Yet, they also leave room for imaginative, and
subtle, change. Changes may come about when people
articulate the age-old stories in the course of a conversa-
tion. As the authors write ‘…narratives, as we understand
them, are never static but are always shaped by the
moments of enunciation’([19] 7).
Macnaghten, Davies and Kearnes certainly have a
point when they argue that agency needs to be granted to
tellers of a story by its recipients in a social context—in
this case policy makers—and they do make space for
tellership and agency in their perspective to narrative. It
remains, however, unclear how large that space is.
While they state that stories ‘are shaped’ in the process
of telling them, they do not make clear how, or on the
basis of what, tellers can possibly do that. Macnaghten
and his colleagues continue to talk about tellers in
somewhat passive phrases, therewith giving the impres-
sion that tellers are shaped by the stories, rather than the
other way around. It is, therefore, unsurprising that they
suspect that ‘enduring narratives exist’, which ‘may
provide publics, consciously or not, with the cultural
resources to develop an imagination of the social issues
associated with emerging technology...’ ([19] 8).3
It is unsatisfying, however, to leave it at that. I think
Davies, Macnaghten and Kearnes are very right to claim
that stories are not invented on the spot by the people who
take part in lay ethics interventions. There are, however,
resources available in narrative ethics which allow to
elaborate this perspective to narrative a few steps further.
Their approach to narrative is very similar to perspectives
that have been put forwards by communitarian virtue
ethicists during the past decades and which have attracted
a lot of debate. Charles Taylor is one of these ethicists
who is sometimes called ‘communitarian’ because he,
just like some others, takes the historical past of a com-
munity to be informative for present day moral stand-
points. As narrative plays a prominent role in the accounts
that these ethicists give of how a person or a social
community can be characterized as ‘the same’ at several
moments in time, they are also sometimes referred to as
‘narrative ethicists’. In the following, some elements of
the debate will be resumed that the perspective by Taylor
and others attracted, in order enrich the approach by
Macnaghten, Davies and Kearnes and point towards
ways to at the same time accept that stories are rooted
in the past and transcend individuals and groups of
present-day debaters, while also leaving room for tellers
to actively shape the story they inherited and talk intelli-
gently about choices for the future.
Narrative ethics and the debate about tradition
The ‘transcendent’ perspective to stories was brought
forwards most prominently in the 1980’s by two virtue
ethicists Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, who
argued against the individualism in deontological and
utilitarian forms of ethics, which were developed during
the Enlightenment [16–17, 30]. The well-known story
about the Enlightenment3 is that people were liberated
from the oppressive powers of church and sovereign,
3 Alasdair MacIntyre speaks about the ‘Enlightenment project’,
but of course it was not a ‘project’with a pre-formulated goal at all.
It is more like a complex historical development in which some
philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, de-
veloped radical new ways to rethink what ethics is and what it
would require people to do, which allowed individuals to find in
themselves a basis to think about what good and bad is regardless
of authoritative institutions in their times.
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which was supported by the theoretical development of
an ethics which laid the power of moral decision-
making in the hands of individuals; that is, in their
capacity to reason (Kant; deontology) or in their capac-
ity to experience the effects of actions on people’s
wellbeing (Bentham; utlititarianism). MacIntyre and
Taylor became famous for saying that this liberating
project has a downside; the moral vocabulary of people
impoverished (like, in a checklist approach), because the
individuals charged with the task to find appropriate
moral measures in their own reason or experience, lost
the connection to each other as well as to the moral
language that provided them with historical resources to
think about their lives and the choices they have to
make. The work by MacIntyre and Taylor reveals their
attempts to restore the connection to that shared past.
While MacIntyre takes a radical stance and discards any
approach to ethics that isolates individuals from the
social context that provides themwith meaningful moral
distinctions, Charles Taylor provides a more heteroge-
neous account which includes deontology and utilitari-
anism in the rich traditional background of contempo-
rary inhabitants of democratic societies in the West.
Both MacIntyre and Taylor, however, presuppose
that the social values inherited from the past transcend
the individual as well as the immediate interaction be-
tween people in the here and now, just like Macnaghten
and his colleagues do. MacIntyre metaphorically ex-
plains that for newcomers in a particular social commu-
nity that already uses moral distinctions, it is like being
put on a stage and becoming part of a play that they did
not invent themselves; and Charles Taylor uses a spatial
metaphor saying that seeking moral orientation is like
the search for spatial orientation: both take place in a
space that was already there before they arrived. Just
like people could not come to reflect that ‘… since they
were spatial beings, they ought after all to develop a
sense of up and down, right and left, and find landmarks
which would enable them to get around’, they likewise
cannot imagine living without moral discriminations as
they were always already living in a ‘moral space’ ([30]
31). It is therefore of little use to try to find the source of
value within oneself, for it ‘belongs to the class of the
inescapable’ for human beings ‘(..) to exist in a space of
questions about strongly valued goods, prior to all
choice or adventitious cultural change’ ([30] 31). With-
out a space of questions about what ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is,
which took shape in a history of interaction, an individ-
ual would not know where to begin thinking about what
it would be sensible to do or to be. Any individual who
would try to do this, according to Taylor, ‘would be
outside our space of interlocution; he wouldn’t have a
stand in the space where the rest of us are.We would see
this as pathological’ ([30] 31).
Quotes such as these have led to a lively debate
about whether and how much individuals can
change the moral discriminations that define the
moral spaces in which they seek their initial orien-
tation in life. This is a question that concerns the
individual, as well as society; for, individuals are
the present participants in that society and as such,
they are the ones to decide what moral distinctions
that they inherited from the past deserve to be
preserved and which ones ought to be changed
for the coming generations. Both MacIntyre and
Taylor explicitly state that it is possible for indi-
viduals to revise the morality that they inherited
from past generations. They preserve the agency of
the tellers of stories, by ascribing to them the
power to co-create the storyline that relates past
to future and which may narrate a history of
change. Considerations about what aspects of past
morality deserve continuation and what aspects
should be revised are part of what they call a
‘narrative quest’ ([16] 219, [30] 48). A narrative
‘quest’ differs from ‘research’ in the sense that it
does not focus on cognitive knowledge which aims
to be verifiable in all times and places; a narrative
quest roots in concrete life experiences of particu-
lar people.
A quest may be understood individually, but
also socially. Socially, it connects the past history
of a concrete human interaction or ‘practice’—say,
rearing children, farming, architecture or medi-
cine—with the future by telling a story about past
experiences and how perspectives generated from
them on the goals that should be realized in the
future or in what ways those goals should be
realized. Individually, it is the result of a person’s
attempt to navigate temporal existence, grappling
with the meaning of past events and experiences
that are definitive of one’s life in order to come to
a better understanding of the goods that are worth
pursuing in the future. Taylor writes: ‘.. making
sense of my present action (..) requires narrative
understanding of my life, a sense of what I have
become which can only be given in a story. And
as I project my life forward and endorse the
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existing direction or give it a new one, I project a
future story, not just a state of the momentary
future but a bent for my whole life to come’
([30] 48).
Narrative quests are lived, they connect to a histo-
ry of (shared) experiences and they function to create
coherence towards the future. The constituents of
narrative quests, as well as their characteristic
storylines, have therefore been imagined in different
ways by different authors. Taylor just states very
generally that people pursue the good life in those
quests, individually as well as socially; but in
MacIntyre’s work, narrative quests serve to realize
excellence in a specific social or professional role,
or as a human being in general. This MacIntyrian
interpretation of the content of a quest as a search
for excellence has, however, been criticized by femi-
nist philosophers such as Margaret Walker, who sus-
pects that talk about excellence equals morality to the
development of ‘career selves’, which fails to appre-
ciate capacities such as flexibility and resilience need-
ed to deal with the ‘complexity of human lives, hopes
and cares’ ([35] 120/121). Most versions of feminist
ethics of care and narrative medicine take a very
different attitude to narrative quests; they diversify
the moral language used in a specific political context
by means of the introduction of a care-vocabulary
into it [2, 23], or they highlight the moral significance
of specific responses to experiences of loss and suf-
fering. Narrative medicine scholar Arthur Frank, for
example, states that quest narratives primarily func-
tion to communicate an understanding of suffering as
a constituent of life and to bear witness to a transfor-
mation of the character of an individual person who
has to develop (partly moral) capacities to deal with it
([10] 128). He considers telling such quest narratives
itself a moral act, because in dialogue relationships
are intensified, but also because this type of experi-
ences is made accessible as a cultural resource that
can be used to find answers to the question how to
live. While these illness stories are very personal,
they always root in society and serve an individual
as well as a societal purpose.
While the content of a quest has acquired different
forms, there has been a lot of debate about the extent to
which the historical rootedness of such quests imposes
restrictions on the agency that people can develop in
shaping it. As people who deviate too much from tradi-
tion cease to be sensible discussion partners (Taylor
wrote, they are ‘outside our space of interlocution’),
the question arises whether and how much freedom
individual agents actually have to revise traditions. This
is partly understood as a political question. Feminist
philosopher Susan Moller Okin, for example, made a
distinction between two meanings of tradition in
MacIntyre’s work; ‘tradition’ as a ‘defining context,
stressing the authoritative nature of its ‘texts^ and tradi-
tion as ‘living’, as a ‘not yet completed narrative’, as an
argument about the goods that constitute the tradition’
([22] 61). While she could live with the last, she sus-
pects that authors who use the word ‘tradition’ might
eventually defend the first, which leaves little room for
moral reformation in a narrative quest.
These two concepts of tradition have played an im-
portant role in the debate about agency in the field of
narrative ethics. Liberal philosopher Jeffrey Stout uses
them and writes that they go together with two different
ways to deal with moral deviance in a particular society.
Those who consider a tradition a ‘defining context’ tend
to be more conservative and seek a managerial response
to individuals with deviating opinions, such as by deny-
ing them the right to participate in decision making (or
the right to vote), denying them promotions, excluding
them as members of the community, or imposing cen-
sorship on their views. Those who take tradition to be
‘living’, by contrast, choose to approach tradition in a
way that Stout calls ‘liberal’; they are open and tolerant
to individuals with deviating views and arguments and
seek dialogue with them because they understand the
moral project of the tradition to be a ‘not yet completed
narrative’ and therefore another person may be able to
teach them something. Stout himself thinks that both
approaches are possible, in practice, because society can
become more traditional or liberal depending on how it
decides to deal with differences of opinion. Stout him-
self argues for dedicated support to the project of loos-
ening up the managerial attitude towards deviant opin-
ions and to instead solve moral disagreement ‘democrat-
ically and dialogically’([26] 136).
Sabina Lovibondmakes a similar distinction between
a conservative and a liberal stance towards inherited
moral distinctions in an earlier work, but adds to the
political discussion also an epistemological layer ([14]
173–175). According to her, engagement in an open
dialogue, and being able to judge whether rival opinions
are properly argued for, presupposes the existence of
institutions which in principle take a management atti-
tude towards difference of opinion. Children, and to
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some extent other newcomers in society, are at first
initiated into the moral distinctions that regulate interac-
tions in a particular society. In the course of their moral
upbringing, training or education, they are ‘managed’ or
‘coerced’ in the sense that any of their deviant uses of
evaluative words such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘just’ and ‘rec-
ommendable’ is corrected or even punished ([14] 60/
61). Paradoxically, however, it is by being forced to
learn these moral distinctions as well as the basic skills
of sound argumentation, that people also acquire the
capacity to pursue their own moral quest in which they
might preserve past moral wisdoms, but also correct
them based on newly acquired beliefs and experiences.
Becoming able to pursue a narrative quest is therefore
made possible by institutions that at the same time
constrain them. This means that each adult person who
engages in a quest may encounter obstacles in their
environment (as in conservative institutions) but also
within themselves towards change, for too much devia-
tion from the past may undermine their own feeling of
personal stability. People can be trained to become less
fearful of that instability, and become open towards the
opinions of others and to cultivate tolerance towards
difference of opinion. This is what is typically done in
liberal societies. But in a conservative tradition, individ-
ual as well as social stability is expected to depend on
the authority of traditional moral distinctions and there-
fore deviant opinions will receive a management
response.
In Ethical formation [15], Lovibond adds an interest-
ing elaboration of the type of criticism of the past that
this liberal view would invite. As every individual is
shaped by a particular moral upbringing (hence, the title
Ethical formation), which enables him or her to think
about morality but also constrains thoughts, Lovibond
thinks that a liberal criticism should be a ‘determinate
critique’ ([15] 144). A determinate critic stays tied to his
or her historical past to the extent to which it provides a
narrative quest with a starting point and the narrator with
basic argumentative and dialogical skills. A determinate
criticism can be recalcitrant towards traditional values
and norms and challenge them incessantly, but it will
never become like anarchism. An anarchist critic aban-
dons the established moral order entirely because it
considers it to be expressive of a clash of forces rather
than of rational argumentation ([15] 145). Whether to
take the attitude of a determinate critic, or of an anar-
chist, however, is the object of a choice, for a tradition
always at the same time uses power as well as arguments
and the two are interdependent. A determinate critic
chooses to concentrate on whether or not good argu-
ments can be given for present moral constellations,
looking at past morality as a collection of answers to
specific queries and looking for ways to improve those
answers towards a future of yet unrealized experience.
As such, it is distinctive for determinate critics to at-
tempt to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
forms of authority in society, based on whether or not
reasonable arguments can be provided for it. While it is
always possible to take a conservative or anarchist per-
spective towards tradition and highlight the power-play
in it, determinate critics choose to contribute tomaking a
tradition ‘living’ and supportive of a liberal society,
which allows and encourages open and argumentative
discussions about whether or not moral distinctions of
the past are worth preserving or not.
Suggestions for a lay ethics quest
This debate in narrative ethics, written down much too
briefly here, gives some threads to think about whether
and how the past can be relevant for decision-making
which shapes the future in lay ethics, and how cannot
be. It gives reason to say that the ‘archetypical’ stories,
which transcend the utterances of participants in focus
groups considering the nanotechnological future in the
present, do not in themselves provide reasons to make
choices which give shape to the future. While the arche-
typical stories certainly offer a rich and varied perspec-
tive to the values that play a role in the public’s consid-
erations, they do not reveal whether it would be good or
bad to act on them (or some other type of story told in
society) towards the future.
Davies, Macnaghten and Kearnes tend to see it as an
authority problem if the stories that lay ethicists tell do
not influence decision making, and plead for an institu-
tional change which makes policy makers more respon-
sive to the stories of lay ethicists ([19] 14). This is a
valuable point, for a critical debate on the dominant
evaluative distinctions of the past can only thrive if
dialogue and exchange of opinions is cultivated in soci-
ety. The institutional change that they defend fits into the
call for a liberal approach to debate, which Stout and
Lovibond also defended, and which demands a tolerant
and open attitude to difference of opinion.
But choosing a narrative approach, it seems, would also
invite to think more about how lay ethics interventions
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ought to be shaped to make room for liberal story-telling.
A story may be more or less successful in influencing
policy, which may depend on many factors, such as the
attentiveness (or resistance) of the recipients of a story, the
storytelling skills of the teller (whomay be a rhetoric talent
or a hesitant suggestor), the level of detachment or
embeddedness of the story in concrete experiences of
tellers (which may or may not be shared by the listeners)
and the ordering (or disordering) of the storyline in time, as
well as the (moral) acceptability of the message for a
specific public. But quite apart from the question whether
or not a story is successfully communicated and listened
to, which a narrative perspective may help to analyze and
understand better, it is important to think about what kind
of tellership needs to be promoted in participants in lay
ethics interventions.
As it is the purpose of lay ethics to not only collect a
broad perspective to value, but to also to empower
members of the public to shape the technological future,
it may be advisable to invite them to take part in a
narrative quest. This requires to position them as active
storytellers; agents who are agents in a quest. The diffi-
culty with the ‘archetypical stories’ is that they are re-
told, and that by retelling them lay ethicists do not act as
storytellers who pursue a quest, for they do not do
suggestions as to how discrepancies between the diverse
(counter-) narratives inherited from the past could be
reconciled to shape a course of action towards the future.
Pursuing a quest, means accepting the ambiguous and
conflicting stories (which may include archetypical
ones) which generated historically as part of one’s past
and taking a role in trying to make them more coherent
in an intelligible storyline that sketches a desirable de-
velopment towards the future. Asking lay ethicists to act
like pursuers of a quest who help to shape the future
would demand to invite them to accept agency and
consider conflicting stories about science that are part
of their history and which inform present experiences
and ask them which elements are worth preserving, and
why, in the face of the choices that have to be made
towards the future.
On the basis of a narrative ethics background, several
suggestions may be done to encourage lay ethicists’
engagement in such a quest. As part of a narrative quest,
lay ethicists should be asked, first, to reflect on a specific
question or choice that relates to their experience as a
person and a citizen. This is what Ferrari and Nordmann
have also suggested in their critical response to the lay
ethics interventions by Davies and Macnaghten [9]. Such
questions could be very general and invite participants to
reflect on whether and how nanotechnology research can
contribute to the good life or the good society, such as: do
you think nanotechnology should help to alleviate needs,
and which/whose needs deserve priority? Or they could
be asked to reflect on specific visions of the relation
between science and society and be asked to reflect on
the question: what should the role of science and tech-
nology development in society be, and how can present
nanotechnology research contribute to that?
But participants can also be invited to reflect on more
concrete issues such as: what application would you as
individual prefer (and why)? What application deserves
priority in society (and why)? Or more reflectively: do
you think possibilities for human enhancement, enabled
by nanotechnology, allow you to become a better or a
worse person? (How) would it change your relation to
other people, and would you value that? And (how)
would it change your relation to society as a whole,
and would you like that? Again, questions can be made
even more specific when they are narrowed down fur-
ther to make them contribute to concrete research; they
can be asked to provide input to the list of requirements
for a technological product, which researchers often
develop prior to testing it; or members of the public
could inform the selection of outcome measures for tests
on people, as in patient trials.
In all of these ways, the question makes nanotech-
nology relevant for the lives of lay ethicists, which will
make it more likely that they integrate it into a quest. If
they have to give an answer to such questions, partici-
pants cannot simply repeat past ‘archetypical’ stories;
they at the very least have to make the stories relevant
for the question at hand, which means that they have to
pick and choose what elements of the story they would
want to use to provide an answer. This brings us to the
second ingredient of narrative quests: argumentation. As
part of a narrative quest, lay ethicists would have to be
invited to provide arguments for their position; even if
they draw on past stories, they would have to argue why
they think these stories or these elements of stories are
deserving and provide a good perspective on the issue at
hand. Participants in lay ethics interventions need to
take a personal perspective to the stories they inherited
and argue towards other participants why they deserve
preservation or alternatively, change.
Argumentation is needed, also, because archetypical
stories are not the only starting point for fruitful ethical
reflection. Society offers plenty of resources to start
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reflection. Therefore, anyone who chooses to repeat ei-
ther an Enlightenment story of scientific progress or an
age-old story about Pandora’s Box has something to
explain. While not all narrative ethicists who use the
concept of a narrative quest take tradition to be equally
heterogeneous, it seems to be fair to defend such a
perspective here, given the richness and variety of views
about technological innovations in contemporary democ-
racies.4 The third element of a narrative quest would
therefore require to do effort to provide diverse input to
the reflection of lay ethicists, which does justice to a
variety of stories and meanings available in the social
world and which allows participants to pick and choose
the elements that they want to build on for the future.
Some authors proposed to do effort to diversify the
input for reflection about the technological future. As
the future is the object of imagination, some they pro-
posed to do more effort to enhance lay ethicists’ imag-
ination [29]. Marianne Boenink, Tsjalling Swierstra and
Dirk Stemerding have, for example, sketched alterna-
tive, fictional, moral worlds in their jointly written arti-
cles [1, 27–28]. These moral fictions take the form of
techno-ethical scenarios and allow to imagine how a
society, and its morality, might develop as an effect of
the introduction of a new technology into it. These
techno-ethical scenarios are proposed as ‘tools’ to loos-
en people’s connection to their cultural heritage and help
them to imagine different socio-moral possibilities ([1]
2). They encourage to leave usual moral stances behind,
at least temporarily, in order to imagine alternative moral
possibilities, or, in Swierstra’s words, they encourage to
‘…jump our ‘moral shadows’ as far as we can’ ([28] 3).5
Another second way to diversify the input that lay
ethics take into account, can be found in card-based meth-
odologies to enhance ethical reflection of members of the
public [7]. Narratives, in this approach, are understood to
generate from a conversation; therefore, they never possess
a nicely polished, or entertaining, storyline, such as the
archetypical stories or the techno-ethical scenarios; narra-
tive is developed in real time in a conversation between
discussion partners and therefore it often has a searching,
unstable, uncertain, multiple and even ‘unruly’ character
[6]. The card-based approach to such lay ethics interven-
tions is developed by Ulrike Felt, Simone Schumann,
Claudia Schwarz and Michael Strassnig and aims to en-
hance imagination of participants in conversations about
new technologies [7]. The cards offer diverse input to this
conversation. Story cards, for example, provide perspec-
tives of specific people about a nanotechnological applica-
tion that is being discussed, such as researchers, ethicists,
policy-makers, members of the industry, NGO representa-
tives or citizens who write letters to the newspaper. Appli-
cation cards introduce different possible nanoapplications,
which may already be available products or which can
represent possible future products. Issue cards invite par-
ticipants to consider nanotechnology in a wider socio-
political context and bring to attention ethical, environmen-
tal, health, economic, legal and political questions and
arguments. And future cards invite participants to engage
with topics concerning the co-evolution of technology and
society and represent concrete visions of the nanotechno-
logical future (showing how nano can lead to a safer, more
environmentally friendly, healthier society, for example).
The content of the four types of cards is based on
a variety of contemporary resources such as media
reports, policy documents, websites, as well as in-
formation from qualitative interviews with relevant
stakeholders such as scientists, NGO representatives
and policy makers. In this way, the card game pays
tribute to the heterogeneity of current society as well
as the diversity of issues and choices that are in need
of attention. The cards function as an ‘open resource
box’; it offers input to their reflection, but also
allows participants flexibility in deciding for them-
selves what aspects they will take into account and
which ones they will ignore or (temporarily) set
aside ([7] 6). Furthermore, as the game asks partic-
ipants first to choose cards on their own, and then
share and discuss their choices with other
4 Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor differ for example in this
respect.
5 In order to make these scenarios useful for lay ethics interven-
tions, Swierstra, Boenink and Stemerding argue that they should
not be wild phantasies ([26] 120). While they are fictions, they are
the product of ‘controlled speculation’, which sketches a line of
development that is ‘convincing’, ‘plausible’ or ‘likely’ to actually
materialize because it is anchored in historical developments ([1]
6). A controlled speculation should be shaped in a step-by-step
manner, which starts with an investigation of the present moral
landscape that may be effected by the arrival of a new technology,
and which is rooted in history (step 1), then it goes on to sketch
moral controversies that the new technology could raise, whose
characteristic tropes and patterns can be described in the scenario
(step 2), and in the last phase, the future closure of the moral
controversies is imagined, based on information about what as-
pects of morality have proved in the past to be more liable to
change (step 3). Using this step-by-step approach, the authors
attempt to suggest a direction of development ‘that might be
considered plausible in the light of past and present, moral and
technological developments’ ([26] 2). Only scenarios that people
could imagine becoming real are considered worthy of debate.
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participants, it invites them to argue for their choices
([7] 17).
In closing off this article, it is suggested that maybe the
evaluative contribution of lay ethicists to decision-
making at future can be much greater, if these three
constituents of narrative quests are taken into account. If
lay ethicists are asked to (1) reflect on a specific question
or choice, (2) use diverse (imaginative) input which is
informative about the heterogeneity of viewpoints in
society and (3) argue for their standpoints, they could
be encouraged to behave more like storytellers who have
a role in the narrative quest of society, and whose contri-
bution to the ways in which the future should be shaped
could become less non-committal and more insightful.
While it is certainly useful to know that the reflection of
lay ethicists roots in the past, this knowledge should not
stifle the reflection about what lay ethics might contribute
towards reflections about the future. Rather than looking
at the traditional resources that lay ethicists use as
expressions of their wish to continue or repeat the
past, we should develop a response which is more
informed about how past stories, or tradition, shapes
present day reflections, and how that past can be used
in better and worse ways. Narrative ethics may be a
valuable resource for this. Authors such as Stout and
Lovibond show that use of tradition does not have to
lead to an endless repetition of past views; it may also
contribute to an open substantive debate about the
value of future technologies which provides input
that can be used to navigate the future. It probably
does not, however, become a substantive ethical de-
bate by itself; we have to continue to do effort to
make the debate open and argumentative and think
about the obstacles encountered on the way which
may turn such reflections into conservative repeti-
tions of the past.
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